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Jessica L. Zamora

Free speech and the Workplace:
THE PROPRIETY OF EMPLOYERS’ REGULATING UNIONIZED EMPLOYEES’ OFF-SITE
SPEECH
JESSICA L. ZAMORA
I.

INTRODUCTION

In an era of increasing interconnectivity communication, exchanging information has
increased to levels unknown in earlier times.

In particular, technological advances and

programs, such as social media have saturated participants with constant updates about the
people in their social sphere. Consequently, the line between employees’ work and private lives
is harder to distinguish. 1 Some theorists speculate that social-media related terminations will
accelerate in the coming years as young adults begin their professional lives and enter the
workforce. 2 In response to a perceived threat, many employers have taken precautions by
advising their employees not to discuss company matters in public or to managers, co-workers or
the company itself, as violations could be a firing offense.3 The extent to what actions employer
can regulate online communication in and out of the work place is a question in the courts
presently.
Twenty-first century social media permeates the American workplace.4 In 2010, Mariana
Cole-Rivera was fired from Hispanics United of Buffalo, a nonprofit social services provider in
1

Emeline Gaske, Like it or not, Facebook pots could cost your job, THE AGE. (Oct. 10, 2012) available
http://www.theage.com.au/opinion/society-and-culture/like-it-or-not-facebook-posts-could-cost-your-job-2012100927b7h.html.
2
Catherine Crane, Social Networking v. the Employment-at-Will Doctrine: A Potential Defense for Employees Fired
for Facebooking, Terminated for Twittering, Booted for Blogging, and Sacked for Social Networking, 89 WASH.
U.L. REV. 639, 640 (2012).
3
Steven Greenhouse, Even if it Engages Your Boss, Social Net Speech Is Protected, N.Y.Times (Jan. 21, 2013)
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/22/technology/employers-social-media-policies-come-under-regulatoryscrutiny.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
4 Bryan Russell, Facebook Firings and Twitter Terminations: The National Labor Relations Act As A Limit on
Retaliatory Discharge, 8 WASH. J. L. TECH. & ARTS 29, 30 (2012).
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upstate New York, for an Internet posting she made on Facebook, a social networking site. 5
Mariana posted a Facebook message asking, “My fellow co-workers, how do you feel?” in
response to a colleague that threatened to tell their supervisor that they were not working hard
enough.6 Some of her co-workers responded saying, “Try doing my job. I have five programs,”
and “What the hell, we don’t have a life as it is.” 7 After this exchange, Hispanics United
dismissed Ms. Cole-Rivera and four other caseworkers who responded to her post, on the basis
that they had violated the company’s harassment policies by going after the caseworker who
complained.8
Mariana filed a suit with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). 9 In a 3-to-1
decision, the NLRB concluded that the caseworkers had been unlawfully terminated. 10 The
Board opined that the posts in 2010 were in the genus of “concerted activity” for “mutual aid”
that is expressly protected by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).11 Mariana’s posts might
have displeased the employer, but mere unpleasantness is not enough to make her speech
actionable.
Efforts to resolve employee Internet speech issues range from allowing employers to fire
employees over any Internet speech to claiming an employee has a right to talk about whatever
he or she want outside the workplace.12 In recent rulings and advisories, labor regulators have

5

Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc., 3-CA-27872, 2011 WL 3894520 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges Sept. 2, 2011).
Id.
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc., 2011 WL 3894520 *10.
12
Ken Matheny & Marion Crain, Disloyal Workers and the “Un-American” Labor Law, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1705,
1708 (2004) (quoting Deborah A. Ballam, Employment-At-Will: The Impending Death of a Doctrine, 37 Am. Bus.
L.J. 653, 653 (2000)).
6
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declared employer’s restrictions on social media posts illegal.13 The NLRB says workers have a
right to discuss work conditions freely and without fear of retribution, regardless of whether the
discussion takes place online.14 Still, to what extent can employers use social networking posts to
dismiss employees from work? Can employers craft their work policies to compromise
wholesale the right to speak one’s mind?
This paper explores the implications of that decision for unionized employees’ free
speech rights, particularly when the employee exercises those rights off-site, most usually
through social media, blogs and other Internet tools. The interests of both the employer and
employee are of the upmost important and must be considered when drafting new social media
rules. Those interests are addressed throughout the paper as I propose that the how the NLRB
should apply a narrow, direct, and clear test to social media speech. A healthy balance of
employer and employees’ interest must be met.
First, this paper will discuss the history of how First Amendment Values came to be
applied to organized labor. Second, this paper will consider how the NLRB came to
accommodate union’s free speech right. Third, this paper will discuss the how the NLRB has
treated cases on employer’s First Amendment rights. Fourth, this paper will discuss special
concerns for First Amendment Values raised by social media for union members and employers.
Fifth, this paper will conclude by giving recommendation on how employers can draft their
social media policies in a way to benefit both the employer and employee.
II. HISTORY OF FIRST AMENDMENT VALUES AS APPLIED TO ORGANIZED
LABOR

13
14

Id. at 1708.
Id.
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A. The Rise of Unions
Labor unions were born at the turn of the nineteenth century as the United States was
transforming from a rural and small-town agricultural economy into an urban and industrial
one.15 People migrated from farm work and enter the industrial wage labor.16 In this early era a
free labor or “laissez-faire” system was in favor. 17 In this system both the employer and
employee were free to make employment contracts on any terms they found mutually
advantageous. 18 This resulted as “employment at will” contract. 19 An employment at will
contract is an agreement that either party can terminate the working relationship at any time and
with no subsequent liability to the employer.20 Under these terms, either party could terminate
the contract for any reason whatsoever. Most importantly, the state would not interfere as
individuals bargained over wages, hours, and working conditions.
Shortly after the industrial revolution, in workers realized that there was power in
numbers. Labor unions were formed to reform the industrial labor-relations system.21 Unions,
voluntary associations of workers, use strength in numbers to bargain with their employers.
Organized labor activity increased after the Civil War, by the industrial revolution. 22 Union
members used many tactics, such as withholding their labor in an effort to bring economic
pressure on their employer. They would also boycott and picket in their place of employment to
persuade other workers not to take their jobs and to persuade customers to refuse to deal with

15

Book Tower Garage v. United Auto Workers Michigan's New Deal, 88-FEB MICH. B.J. S2, S2 (2009).
Id.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Id. at S3.
20
Id.
21
Book Tower Garage v. U.A.W., 88-FEB MICH. at S3.
22
Bryan M. O'Keefe, The Employee Free Choice Act's Interest Arbitration Provision: In Whose Best Interest?, 115
PENN ST. L. REV. 211, 213 (2010).
16
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struck employers. To combat the growing influence of unions, employers used judicial
injunctions to end strikes and the judiciary often complied with management's request.23

Until the Great Depression, workers had almost no protection when in unions.24 Judges
exercised discretion over labor-management issues, and tended to be unsympathetic to
employees.25 Courts held union activities, such as strikes, pickets, and secondary boycotts, to be
illegal.

26

Additionally, Courts issued injunctions to any union activities. 27 As the Great

Depression of the 1930's swept the nation, employees filed suits against employers due to the
unjust treatment of workers in worker-management relationships.28 The workers succeeded in
demonstrating the previous years judicial defeats and increasing labor disruptions and that
prompted Congress and the Executive Branch to act. The Court began to see wages and working
conditions as a matter of public importance and is thereby vital to production.29 The acts passed
by Congress included: the Erdman Act which provided for the resolution of railroad labor
disputes; the Clayton Antitrust Act, which limited antitrust laws' applicability to union activity;
the Railway Labor Act, which expanded the Erdman Act and provided support for collective
bargaining on the railways; and the Norris-LaGuardia Act in 1932, which broadly prohibited
federal courts from enjoining peaceful labor disputes.30

23

Id. at 214.
Id.
25
Peter B. Ajalat, The Decline of the American Labor Movement: A Proposal for the Constitution As A Source of
Workers' Rights, 6 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 683, 712 (1996).
26
Id.
27
Id. at 692.
28
David L. Gregory, The Right to Unionize in the United States, Canada, and Mexico: A Comparative Assessment,
10 HOSTRA LAB. L. J. 537, 545 (1993).
29
Ajalat, supra note 25, at 712.
30
Id. at 713.
24
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Three years after the Norris-LaGuardia Act, Congress enacted the most powerful act of
all, the National Labor Relations Act (Wagner). 31 The Wagner Act forced employers to
recognize and bargain with unions elected by a majority of their workers and outlawed various
anti-union tactics.32 It also established the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), to enforce
the Act. 33 With all of these legislative encouragements, the power of labor unions grew,
culminating in the formation of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), which set out to
organize unskilled workers in the mass-production industries like autos, steel, rubber, and
meatpacking.34
III. HISTORY OF NLRA AND ITS ACCOMMODATION OF EMPLOYEES’ FREE
SPEECH RIGHTS
The NLRB's primary responsibility is interpretation and enforcement of a federal statute
called the NLRA.35 The NLRA is the main labor policy governing labor relations in the United
States governs private union member’s speech. Section 7 and 8 of the NLRA is considered the
most important provisions of the Act for union members. Under Section 7, “employees shall
have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection . . .”. 36
Section 8, now 8(a) bans “unfair labor practice[s]” such as employer interference, coercion, or
restraint of employees in the exercise of Section 7 rights including domination or assistance of
labor organizations, discrimination based on union membership discrimination based on
participation in proceedings under the Act and refusal to bargain in good faith with a union
31

Id.
Id.
33
Id. at 715.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006).
32
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representing employees.37 The Act established a mechanism for the election and certification of
representative labor organizations, based on the principle of majority rule.38
The NLRA applies to all employers, unionized or not.39 Most relevant to the area of
social media, the NLRA protects an employee's right to engage in "concerted activity," which
occurs under Section 7 of the statute "when two or more employees take action for their mutual
aid or protection regarding terms and conditions of employment." “Concerted Activity” is
activities workers may partake in without fear of employer retaliation. 40 There is protected
concerted activity when two or more employees act together to improve their terms and
conditions of employment, even where there is no union involved.41
The NLRA established the NLRB, a quasi-judicial tribunal and administrative agency to
administer representation proceedings and to enforce the Act, subject to judicial review in the
federal courts of appeals. 42 The Board has the authority to issue unfair labor practices against
management and unions for violations of the law. 43 With the NLRA and NLRB, the United
States Supreme Court seemed more willing to find constitutional rights where labor unions were
concerned. In Thornhill v. Alabama, the Court held that the First and Fourteenth Amendments
protected both labor picketing and organizing.44
The NLRA is of vital importance because in the private sector, the First Amendment does
not generally cover employees. The NLRB has opined that at-will employees can be dismissed

37

Id . at § 158(a)(1).
Id.
39
Frequently Asked Questions, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, http://www.nlrb.gov/faq/nlrb (last visited
Mar. 15, 2013).
40
Ajalat, supra note 25, at 712.
41
Id.
42
Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1527, 1610 (2002).
43
Id.
44
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102-03 (1940).
38
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for such reason a as the color of their shoelaces or the lipstick they wear.45 Moreover, employers
cannot fire an employee for filing a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC). However, they an employer can fire a worker for what they say, unless it's
considered protected activity.
The Supreme Court held that in certain circumstances some employee conduct might be
disloyal to the employer that it loses statutory protection. 46 Section 7 of the NLRA protects
“concerted activities” of employees for “mutual aid or protection” and classifies that speech as
concerted and protected conduct if that speech acts to further a group concern.47
A. Species of Employee Speech which are not protect by the NLRB
The protected speech rights of employees are not absolute. The NLRB has noted several
exceptions that curtail free speech rights of employees about working conditions. Employers are
able to dismiss employees who trespass the boundaries of protected speech. The Board has ruled
that speech that is disloyal, egregious, and breeches confidentiality will not be protected.
The NRLB ruled that an employer is not liable for dismissing an employee whose
conduct is disloyal.48 In NLRB v. Local Union No. 1229, International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers (Jefferson Standard), employees who distributed handbills that made a “sharp, public,
disparaging attack on the quality of the company's product and its business policies” and that did
not mention a labor dispute were not protected from discharge by the NLRA.49 Even though the
NLRB held that the terminations were an “unfair labor practice,” the Supreme Court ruled that

45

How Much Can Employers Limit Workers' Behavior?, NPR TALK NATION (Nov. 11, 2010), 2010 WLNR
22632811.
46
N.L.R.B. v. Local Union No. 1229, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 346 U.S. 464, 466-81(1953).
47
Id. at 470.
48
Id. at 476
49
Id. at 471-72.
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the terminated employees’ communications were so disloyal as to lose protection under the
Act.50 Specifically, the Court noted that: the handbills were distributed at a “critical time” in the
company’s business.51 The Court summarized by stating that there is no more elemental cause
for discharge of an employee than disloyalty to his employer.52
The Jefferson Standard inspired a two-pronged analysis for determining when
communication loses its protection. 53 In In American Golf Corp. (Mountain Shadows I), the
facts are very similar to the Jefferson Standard as an employee was terminated for contacting a
competitor of his company. The worker had distributed a flier that disparaged the company’s
operation, which argued for the company’s competitors to take over the contract. The NRLB
defined the test using the facts of the case. The first prong requires establishing a labor dispute.54
Moreover, it requires an appropriate labor nexus and the flier failed to meet the prong as it
appealed to the interest of the public rather than that of employees.55 The second prong requires
evaluation of whether the communication is “so egregious” that it would supply an independent
cause for discharge. 56 The Board opined that the telephone call was protected but that the
distribution of the flier was not protected under the Jefferson Standard disloyalty exception.57
The Board remanded the Mountain Shadows case to an ALJ to determine if the employee would
have been terminated for cause because of his disloyal conduct independent of his protected
activity.

50

Id. at 466.
Id. at 470.
52
Id. at 471.
53
In Re Am. Golf Corp., 330 NLRB 1238, 1240 (2000).
54
Id. at 1241.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id. at 1238.
51
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After remand the case was appealed again to the NLRB. In Mountain Shadow II the
Board disagreed with the ALJ, that the complainant would not have been terminated despite his
protected conduct, and upheld the legality of the discharge because of the disloyalty, which it
concluded was an independent cause for termination. 58 The Board held:
“employee communications to third parties in an effort to obtain their support are
protected where the communication indicated that it is related to an ongoing labor
dispute between the employees and the employers and the communication is not
so disloyal, reckless or maliciously untrue as to lose the Act's protection.”59
The second unprotected speech is that which is so egregious that the speech looses it
protection. Recently, a NLRB shed light on the issue of workplace profanity, where profanity is
used in the context of a heated debate about wages, hours, and working conditions.60 In In Plaza
Auto Center, Inc., a salesman and his supervisor exchanged numerous profane names in a
meeting where they were discussing working conditions. 61 Subsequently, the salesman was
dismissed.62 The NLRB inquired as to whether conduct is so egregious that it loses the protection
of the NLRA.63 Since the employee's outburst occurred at a meeting held in the context of his
protected concerted activity, the ALJ applied the test set forth by the Board in Atlantic Steel, 245
NLRB 814, 816 (1979), for determining whether the conduct was so egregious as to lose the
protection of the Act.64 In Atlantic Steel, the Board identified four factors to be balanced in the
determination:

58

In Re Am. Golf Corp., 338 NLRB 581, 582 (2002).
Id. at 584.
60
In Re Plaza Auto Ctr., Inc., 355 NLRB No. 85 (2010).
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Atlantic Steel Co., 245 NLRB 814 (1979).
59
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“(1) the place of the discussion; (2) the subject matter of the discussion; (3) the
nature of the employees’ outburst; and (4) whether the outburst was, in any way,
provoked by the employer's unfair labor practices.”65
The Board found that the employer violated Section 8(a)(1) by discharging the salesman based
on his profane outburst in a private meeting with the employer's owner and two sales managers
about wages and working conditions. 66 The Board noted that the salesman’s conduct was a
reaction to the supervisor's own use of profane language, his failure to respond to the salesman's
concerns, and the supervisor's suggestion that if the salesman did not trust the company, he could
work elsewhere. The Board then demanded reinstatement of the salesman.
Breaches in confidentiality are not protected areas of employee free speech.67 Employers
have an interest in keeping trade secrets. Although there are safe guards for employees to discuss
their own working conditions, they are not protected when disseminating information obtained in
confidence or without authorization, even when it concerns terms and conditions of
employment.68
Conversely, false statements may be protected as long as the employee making the
statements does so neither knowingly nor recklessly. 69 Employees do not have a duty to
investigate the truthfulness of information she gets from a co-worker.70 The NLRB has ruled that

65

Id. at 816.
Id. at 818.
67
Phil M. Fowler, Employee Consequences for Breach of Confidentiality, HOUSTON CHRONICLE (last visited Mar.
16, 2013), http://smallbusiness.chron.com/employee-consequences-breach-confidentiality-15476.html.
68
Katherine M. Scott, When Is Employee Blogging Protected by Section 7 of the Nlra?, 2006 DUKE L. & TECH. REV.
17, 22 (2006).
69
Id. at 17, *9.
70
Id. at 17, *13.
66
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such a duty would unacceptably chill employee speech under Section 7.71 The NLRA will not
protect lies made knowingly or recklessly.72
IV. CONTEMPORARY NLRB POSTURE ON FIRST AMENDMENT VALUES IN
THE WORKPLACE AND OFF-SITE SPEECH
Employers cannot regulate everything employees do off-site. Recently, the NLRB has
opined that workers have the right to express themselves freely about their jobs, work conditions,
bosses and other company issues on social networks without having to worry about the
consequences to their salaries, promotion prospects or jobs.73 Profanity towards a boss or saying
negative things about the workplace could be considered protected activity. Employers cannot
fire employees based on unfavorable speech because the law protects workers from engaging in
concerted activity. According to the NLRB Regional Director's handout, "It doesn't take much to
establish the concerted nature of the discussion, so long as it involved or touched upon a term or
condition of employment," and "anything short of physically threatening activity will likely be
protected."74 The employees’ speech might be protected if referring to working conditions.
In 2012, the NLRB interpreted the application of the NLRA to an employees’ posting of
negative statements concerning his employer on social media. In Costco Wholesale Corporation,
the NLRB held that Costco violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act “by maintaining a rule prohibiting
employees from electronically posting statements that ‘damage the Company . . . or damage any
person’s reputation.’” 75 The NLRB held that Costco’s policy would encompass concerted
actions by its employees to protest the treatment of its employees and that kind of
71

Id.
Id.
73
NPR TALK NATION, supra at 2010 WLNR 22632811.
74
Philip Gordon, The Latest from the NLRB on Social Media, WORKPLACE PRIVACY COUNSEL (May 2, 2011).
http://privacyblog.littler.com/tags/nlrb/.
75
Costco Wholesale Corp., 358 NLRB No. 106 (2012).
72
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communication is protected under Section 7. 76 If the rule explicitly restricts Section 7 rights, said
the Board, it is obviously unlawful. If it does not, a violation depends on a showing of one of the
following:
1) employees would reasonably construe the language to prohibit Section 7
activity; 2) the rule was promulgated in response to union activity; or 3) the rule
has been applied to restrict the exercise of Section 7 rights.77
Critically, the NLRB disliked that the policy did not include a specific section for concerted
activities protected by Section 7. The Board ultimately held that the blanket prohibition on any
communication that damages the Company violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act because
employees must be able to engage in concerted activities that are critical of their employers or
the agents of their employers.78
The NLRB faced a similar issue in Karl Knauz Motors, Inc., where the auto dealership
had a vague policy when it came to speech.79 A former employee posted a complaint about the
food the dealership provided to customers at a sales event and a sarcastic message making light
of damage to a vehicle that occurred after a salesperson allowed the son of a customer to get
behind the wheel in the car lot.80 The NLRB applied the same test used in Costco and found the
employer’s “Courtesy” policy violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.81 In this case, the employer
maintained a rule in its handbook stating that being courteous is the responsibility of every
employee.82 The policy stated:

76

Id.
Id.
78
Id.
79
Karl Knauz Motors, Inc., 358 NLRB No. 164 (2012).
80
Id. at *10.
81
Id. at *3.
82
Id. at *1.
77
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“everyone is expected to be courteous, polite and friendly to our customers, vendors and
suppliers, as well as to their fellow employees. No one should be disrespectful or use
profanity or any other language which injures the image or reputation of the
Dealership.”83
The Board went on to say as it did in Costco, that the policy was overbroad because there is
“nothing . . . that would reasonably suggest to employees that employee communications
protected by Section 7 of the Act are excluded from the policy’s reach.”84 The Board feared that
this broad policy holding basic levels of courtesy and common sense could be viewed as a
violation of the Act if it broadly prohibits any language that would injure the image or reputation
of the employer.85
The NLRB has recognized that not all of an employee's online activity, even when speech
relates to workplace matters, is protected activity.86 The NLRB did not only strike down the
dealership’s policy, but also upheld an ALJ’s finding that the employer did not violate the Act by
discharging a sales representative for photos and comments that he posted to his Facebook page,
because the posts that led to his termination were not protected by the Act.87 The ALJ found that
the posting about food provided to customers constituted protected, concerted activity because
the post was just a simple discussion that he and his coworkers were having concerning the
impact of the sales event on their ability to earn money.88 The post about the accident on the
other hand was not protected, concerted activity because “it was posted solely by [the
salesperson] . . . without any discussion with any other employee of, and had no connection to
the any of the employees’ terms and conditions of employment.” 89 The judge found that the

83

Id.
Id.
85
Id.
86
Id.
87
Id. at *20.
88
Id.
89
Id. at *18.
84
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employer was fired because of his Facebook posting concerning the accident, and he upheld the
discharge.90
A. When Employee Speech Becomes Harassment
Employees have found social networking sites such as Facebook and Twitter as the
equivalent of talking to co-workers around the water cooler.91 Unfortunately, some of their social
media postings have been the cause of their dismissal. The term "Facebook fired" has become so
common that it's now a verb on urbandictionary.com.92 Many incidents of this sort of venting
have been documented, for example: 93 In September 2010, a McDonald’s manager was
discharged as writing "F--- them nuggets" on a friend's wall.94
The New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, upheld a discharge of a teacher for
what she posted about her students on Facebook.95 Jennifer O'Brien was a first-grade teacher in a
largely Black and Latino school in Paterson, New Jersey. She posted on her Facebook page that
she felt like a "warden for future criminals."96 At the administrative level, the ALJ recommended
that O'Brien be terminated for her Facebook posts. The school district’s need to operate
efficiently demanded that Ms. O'Brien's free-speech rights be trump because "thoughtless words
can destroy the partnership between home and school that is essential to the mission of the
schools.97" Also, the ALJ found that by posting her comments on Facebook, O'Brien “showed a
disturbing lack of self-restraint, violated any notion of good behavior, and [acted in a manner
90

Id. at *20.
Emily Ngo, Rights? You don't have many when it comes to getting fired for Facebook, AMNEWYORK (Nov. 11,
2010), http://www.amny.com/urbanite-1.812039/rights-you-don-t-have-many-when-it-comes-to-getting-fired-forfacebook-1.2453311.
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
Id.
95 In re O'Brien, No. A-2452-11T4, 2013 WL 132508, at *1(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Jan. 11, 2013).
96
Id.
97
Id.
91
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that was] inimical to her role as a professional educator.”98 The teacher then appealed the ALJ's
decision to the acting commission of education. When the commission agreed with the ALJ,
O'Brien appealed to the N.J. Superior Court. The Court of appeals upheld the termination. The
Court determined that her comments were, indeed, "conduct unbecoming a tenured teacher,"
which is any conduct that has a "tendency to destroy public respect for government employees
and confidence in the operation of public services." 99 Many employers have placed social
policies to tell employees what is prohibited. Although it is reasonable to warn employees not to
disclose trade secrets or confidential financial information, not all policies that regulate employee
speech are acceptable under the NLRA.
American Medical Response of Connecticut (AMR) was the first instance where the
NLRB issued a complaint in response to an employee who was discharged after posting
comments on Facebook that violated the company's blogging and Internet posting policy.100 The
case settled outside of Court, but the NLRB arguments have been applied to many cases.
Dawnmarie Souza, AMR’s Emergency Medical Technician (EMT), was fired after stating that
her boss should have been a psychiatric patient on her Facebook page.101 The NLRB brought a
complaint against the employer for the suspension and firing of an employee who posted
negative comments about her supervisor on her Facebook page. AMR maintains a blogging and
Internet posting policy that prohibits depicting the company in any way without prior company
approval.

102

The company's policy prohibits employees from making “disparaging,

discriminatory or defamatory comments when discussing the company or the employees’
98

Id.at *5.
Id.
100
Christine Neylon O'Brien, The First Facebook Firing Case Under Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act:
Exploring the Limits of Labor Law Protection for Concerted Communication on Social Media, 45 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 29, 33 (2011).
101
Id. at 35.
102
Id.
99
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superiors, co-workers and/or competitors.”103 The company denied that they fired the employee
for her Facebook postings and that the real reason they fired her was because they received two
complaints from patients and hospital staff within a ten-day period leading up to her suspension
and termination.104 The NLRB argued the employer had violated the act by firing her for her
posts and maintaining a "blogging and Internet-posting policy" that "prohibited employees"
from, among other things, "making disparaging comments when discussing the company or the
employees’ superiors, co-workers and/or competitors."105 The NLRB said that this one protected
activity, and the company was wrong to fire her, because the law protects workers from engaging
in concerted activity.106
The AMR’s case gives guidance to other companies, as they need to be cautious when
they create and attempt to enforce social media policies to ensure they do not infringe on
employees' Section 7 rights.107 The NLRB argued that the AMR's blogging and internet-posting
policy was overbroad, constituting a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA because it
unlawfully infringes on Section 7-protected concerted activities.108 The company settled out of
court and agreed to narrow its Internet and blogging policies to ensure that they do not
improperly restrict employees from discussing their wages, hours and working conditions with
co-workers and others while not at work.109 The company also agreed not to punish employees
for requesting a union representative.110 American Medical said in its own written statement that

103

Id.
Id.
105
Id. at 36.
106
Id.
107
Reynolds Holding, Can You Be Fired for Bad-Mouthing Your Boss on Facebook?, TIME (Mar. 4, 2011),
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2055927,00.html.
108
Id.
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it could still bar employees from harassing or defaming co-workers or violating patient
confidentiality or company trademarks on Facebook.111
The NLRB struck down the policies in Costco and Knaus Motors, because they deemed
overbroad. The policies in those cases combined valid rules requiring courtesy and decorum
with impressible rules against disrespectful and defamatory behavior. Any prohibition against
employees disparaging or “defaming” their employer or their supervisors will not likely survive
scrutiny of the current NLRB. The will somehow find such policies to interfere with employees’
right under Section 7 to complain about management and working conditions.
V. BALANCING THE RELEVANT EMPLOYERS’ PRSERVATION OF IMAGE
AND BRAND AGAINST EMPLOYEES’ FREE SPEECH RIGHTS
Employers have a justifiable interest in protecting their image. At the same time,
unionized employees do not surrender their First Amendment rights at the workplace. Moreover,
employees do not have an expectation that their off-site social media speech could cost them
their jobs. Still, the distinction between on-site and off-site speech can be blurred. Both
employer’s and employees’ interest call for a more direct test for protected social media speech.
A. Internet Blurs Lines Between On-Site and Off-Site
We live at a time where almost everyone engages in some sort of social networking, if
it’s blogging or using sites such as Facebook or Twitter. This new way of life has blurred the line
between on-site and off-site workplace communication. Employees now have a new means of
discussing issues with each other, regardless of the obstacles presented by differently-timed
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shifts, physically separated workplaces, and the operational demands of work.112 Employers have
set policy to regulate social media activity but it has been proven to be too broad. The NRLB
needs to adjust to the changing times and start drafting new sections that address the new means
of workplace communication. On the one side, employers have a duty to protect their reputation,
image, culture, and preventing disclosure of confidential information, including avoiding liability
for harassment. On the other side, employees have the right to speak and connect on their own
time and on their own devices as long as they do not violate the employer's legitimate business
interests.113
Coming back to Hispanics United case, the NLRB majority agreed with the ALJ that the
terminated employees’ speech was protected. 114 The NLRB ruled that comments posted on
Facebook are protected in the same manner and to the same extent as comments made at the
"water cooler," because the employees were engaged in concerted activity for their mutual aid
and protection. Most people use social media to let out their frustrations. The Board relied their
judgment on Section 8(a)(1) that bars employers from interfering or restraining, employees in the
exercise of their rights. The ALJ held in the Hispanic United that the Facebook comments in
question constituted protected activity under Section 7 because the employees were taking a first
step towards taking group action to defend themselves against the accusations they could
reasonably believe their fellow co-worker was going to make to management. 115 The Board
reiterated that Section 7 protects employee discussions about job performance. Since the Board
found that Facebook comments were talking about the workplace environment, the majority held
the employees were “clearly engaged in protected activity in mutual aid of each other’s defense”
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to Cruz-Moore’s criticisms of their work performance. 116 Overall, the Board concluded the
terminations violated both Section 7 and Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA because the employees
were terminated solely as a result of their Facebook postings and those Facebook comments were
protected under the Act.
The dissenting opinion, authored by Member Brian Hayes brings into the light not all
speech related to the workplace should be protected. Member Hayes noted that there was “no
credible evidence that Cole-Rivera made her initial posting with the intent of promoting a group
defense, or that her co-workers responded for this purpose.”117 To the contrary, Member Hayes
regarded the Facebook comments as “shop talk” or “group griping,” which has not traditionally
risen to the level of protected activity.118 The Board majority on the other hand emphasized the
Board’s position that Section 7 protects employee discussions about job performance.
Where is the line drawn between protected speech and harassment? There are some limits
to what employees can say. Workers comments cannot be libelous or threatening, expose trade
secrets or clearly interfere with your job. If an employer wants to talk about their life on the
Internet they have all the right to do so.119
B. Prescription For Reform Of The NLRA
Most of the NLRB decisions open the door to the argument that any discussion among
co-workers pertaining to workplace matters could be considered “protected” under the NLRA,
regardless of whether such discussion is undertaken to initiate or prepare for group action in the
interest of employees. 120 While the Facebook comments posted by the HUD employees in
116
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Hispanic United case certainly communicated mutual disagreement with Cruz-Moore’s criticism
of their job performance, they did not suggest or contemplate taking any action in response to
this criticism. Yet, the Board concluded that the comments were protected because they were
undertaken for mutual aid and protection. 121 The majority’s ruling under those circumstances
demonstrates an expansion of the NLRB’s traditional definition of protected concerted activity.
Consistent with that posture, employers should not have the right to prevent unionized
employees from speaking their mind, even if it is on social media sites, unless the employee
speech would be actionable as libel, or any of the other traditional grounds for imposing liability.
Previous NLRB rulings have shown that employers cannot prevent employers from speaking
their mind online. The NLRB, through Costco and Karl Knauz, has held that broad company
policies that prohibit employee statements deemed damaging to the company are a violation of
Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA. It would be best for employers to adopt social media policies that
are clear and consistent with the spirit of such precedent. Specific provisions of such company
policies could include the prohibition against disclosure of trade secrets and other confidential
information, as well as using speech to defame or harass.
By contrast, blanket restrictions on social media speech are illegal. 122 The NLRB’s
rulings advise companies that it is illegal to adopt broad social media policies. 123 Bans on
disrespectful comments or posts that criticize the employer are not a basis for firing an
employee.124 Policies meant to discourage workers from exercising their right to communicate
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with one another are against the law. 125 Indeed, the NLRB recently began ordering the
reinstatement of various workers fired for their posts.126 The Board is further asking companies,
including General Motors, Target and Costco, to rewrite their social media rules.127 The Board’s
rulings apply to virtually all private sector employers, and tell companies that it is illegal to adopt
broad social media policies, such as bans on “disrespectful” comments or posts that criticize the
employer. 128 Government employees enjoy much stronger free speech protections because,
unlike private sector employers, government employers are subject to the restraints of the U.S.
Constitution. 129 Certainly, states are following the NLRB decision in drafting labor law
policies.130 California and Illinois became the fifth and sixth states to bar companies from asking
employees or job applicants for their social network passwords.131
Unfortunately, many employers and employees fail in their policies and posts, to fully
appreciate the power and magnitude of social media. Employers mostly try to regulate what
employees’ say in social media sites because they do not want anything to reflect negatively on
their company or brand. Moreover, young people feel comfortable enough to vent on social
networking sites, deeming those sufficiently separate and distinct from any on-the-job
communication. The law should honor that reasonable expectation unless the speech is
considered to be libel or exposing trade secrets. Employers need to understand that social media
does not equal workplace. Today, it behooves employers to enact better polices regarding social
media use that will not infringe on the rights of employees.

125

Id.
Id.
127
Id.
128
Lostant, Even if It Outrages the Boss, Social Net Speech Is Protected, NEWS LOAF,
http://newsloaf.blogspot.com/2013/01/even-if-it-outrages-boss-social-net.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2013).
129
NPR TALK NATION, supra at 2010 WLNR 22632811.
130
Greenhouse, supra note 3.
131
Id.
126

22

Jessica L. Zamora
For example, Wal-mart’s social policy is exemplar because it only restricts behavior
already proscribed by other laws, such as speech related to trade secrets, harassment and
defamation.132 The NLRB endorsed the Wal-mart policy because it gave specific examples of
conduct that would be improper while at the same time not interfering with employees’ rights.
That sort of careful check on what could otherwise quickly devolve into employer heavyhandedness ought to become the norm.
Employers are not the only ones that need to be careful; employees need to be aware of
the possible consequences of venting on social networks irrespective of the legal standards that
apply. Potential employers review social media sites when considering whom to hire.133 A study,
“Employers Firing Employees over Information Found on Popular Social Media Sites Face
Legal Risks, Employment Screening Resources,” found that thirty-five percent of employers
rejected job applicants based on provocative or inappropriate photographs or information posted
on social media. 134 Mindful that reputation is everything in the workforce, employers have
rejected applicants because of the given candidate’s Facebook context. 135 Activities such as
drinking or using drugs, bad-mouthing previous employers, co-workers, or clients seem a fairly
sure way to get rejected.136 The study also showed that evidence of poor communication skills,
discriminatory comments, misrepresentation of qualifications, and sharing confidential
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information from a previous employer were the other bases mentioned for rejecting an
applicant.137
How can employers in the labor setting avoid violating employees’ right to free speech?
Ultimately, employer policies on social media should begin by “encouraging innovation and
dialogue.”138 Instead of prohibiting speech outright, the policies should aim to provide guidance.
Policies should address the difference between actionable employees’ comments that are
“disloyal” and “have the potential to damage the employer's business and reputation or . . .
breach confidentiality,” from the traditionally protected lunch table or “water cooler”
conversations about terms and conditions of employment.139 Also, employers need to set forth
clearly the protections afforded by Section 7 of the NLRA while at the same time noting that the
statute does not protect egregious misconduct, including violations of law or rules that are
justified by the employer's legitimate business concerns.140
C. Recommendations
The NLRB should take both employers and employees’ interest into account when
drafting social media speech rules. The test that the NLRB applies to social media speech that
relates to the workplace should be narrow, direct, and clear. With today’s standard, virtually any
statement made about the workplace could be considered concerted activity for mutual aid or
protection. When evaluating a given employee’s speech, courts should consider context, so that
social media speech where employees discuss work concerns, whether on Facebook or through
137
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“tweets,” are presumed protected unless in violation of the afore-mentioned categories.141 That
presumption of legitimacy should apply particularly when the speech invites other co-workers to
engage in discussion pertaining specifically to their wages, hours and working conditions. This
new standard will isolate protected speech from unprotected speech.
On nearly any blog or social media site where employees discuss their jobs, some posts,
examined individually, probably “disparage” the employer or its products without explicitly
connecting the criticism to a labor dispute.142 This creates an analytical challenge for the NLRB,
and uncertainty for employees, and employers. The presence of a comment feature on most blogs
and online posts arguably implicitly invites others to participate in the discussion, but to find the
speech protected, a court should have to find that the speech at least implies that co-employees
are the intended audience. That should not be a difficult threshold for courts to cross.
Today, as social media use continues to rise, employers should take care to avoid
infringing on employees’ rights. In drafting and implementing policies, employers should make
their legitimate business objectives clear. Beyond stating that employees should refrain from
engaging in “inappropriate or unacceptable conduct” and that employees are prevented from
divulging “confidential information and trade secrets,” those policies should be more akin to
guidelines than hard and fast rules. In past cases, the NLRB has indicated that a particular social
media policy might have survived scrutiny, if it had included examples and guidelines of
prohibited conduct.
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Employees should be made aware that social media blogs and posts are public and access
is easily available. A sound policy should incorporate language that assures employees that the
intent of the policy is not to infringe upon employees' Section 7 NLRA right. The employee
should be made aware that they are allowed to engage in protected activity and collective action
related to their wages, hours and working conditions. Further, both employers and employees
would be safeguarding their rights if employees were to routinely include a disclaimer on their
social media page that an employee's views, positions and opinions expressed on social media
are those of the employee and not the employer. Most importantly, employers need to advise
employees to use their best judgment and exercise personal responsibility when posting on social
media. The NLRB has repeatedly indicated that a particular policy might have been lawful if it
had included specific examples of prohibited conduct.
Employers should do social media training.143 This training could inform employees of
their professional responsibilities and that those responsibilities apply to social media too. 144
Training could better alert employees to what the company’s interests are. A starting point can be
protecting trade secrets, avoiding SEC violations or protecting employee safety. The training
would explain what each section of the given policy means and how it applies specifically to
employees. The employer could then explain why any restrictions in the policy are important to
the company.
Knowledge is power. With appropriate employee training programs, the promulgation of
clear social media policies and the cultivation of work environment policies and the cultivation
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that promote healthy channels of communication, both employer and employee interests can be
accommodated.
VI. CONCLUSION
The NLRB cases demonstrate that the Board is taking care to ensure that employers are
not implementing policies that unnecessarily infringe on unionized employees' First Amendment
rights. The general message in those cases is that policies involving employer rules prohibiting
employee speech on social media sites are against the NLRA. Blogs and social media sites will
continue to add new twists to established concerted activity doctrine, and courts will have to
strike the balance between employee and employer rights. Courts should strongly protect all
employee bloggers as they engage in legitimate concerted activity, but they should also require
that bloggers bear some responsibility in exercising those rights by identifying themselves as
employees and screening comments for obvious falsehoods and confidentiality breaches.
Existing standards of protection against interference with protected rights should extend readily
into the blogging context.
Still, the on-site, off-site distinction needs to be finessed. Special latitude should be
afforded employees’ off-site speech. With education comes power. Employers need to
communicate to employees the circumstances under which they may be lawfully punished for
their on-line speech. Open and clear lines of communication can help deter employees from
making improper statements, as well as protect against employer overreaching. Courts can be
trusted to resolve the more ambiguous or gray-area cases, provided that they do so within a spirit
of speech protective values.
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